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The heart of insurance—what enables insurance to function—is risk aversion. 
Insurance transactions occur because policyholders prefer the certainty of suffering 
a small loss—the amount of an insurance premium—to the risk of suffering a larger 
loss.1 They are therefore willing to pay premiums that exceed the expected value of 
the individual risks that they pose. Insurers undertake to cover these risks and, 
 
* David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. 
Thanks to David Hyman and the participants in The Relationship Between Insurance and Legal Regulation 
Symposium for comments on a draft of this Article. 
1. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 3 (6th 
ed. 2015). 
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through diversification and the law of averages, the whole risk is smaller than the 
sum of its parts. 
It follows from the fact that potential policyholders are risk averse that 
sometimes they are also averse to the risk that insurance covering loss will not be 
available or, even if insurance is available, will not be reliable. Potential policyholders 
could rationally be willing to pay a premium to ensure that insurance against risks 
to which they are averse is available and that any insurance that is available is reliable. 
The guaranteed renewal protection and prohibitions on medical underwriting 
embodied in the Affordable Care Act (ACA),2 for example, can be understood to 
provide precisely this kind of insurance. I will call the protection that may be 
obtained by paying a premium, or an additional premium, to enhance the availability 
or reliability of coverage “insurance insurance.”3 
As I will show below, administrative and judicial regulation is sometimes 
directed at providing this additional protection. It makes sense, therefore, to think 
of administrative and judicial regulation as—among other things—providing 
insurance insurance. Regulation, however, is not costless, but often raises the price 
of insurance. The increased premiums, if any, that policyholders are charged as a 
result of this form of regulation are what they pay for insurance insurance. 
Because demand for insurance is elastic, however, whether it is possible for 
regulation to generate insurance insurance depends on the interaction of two 
factors: the magnitude of potential policyholders’ risk aversion and the amount of 
the additional “premium” that must be paid for the insurance insurance that 
regulation generates. In addition, regulation may increase the risk of adverse 
selection and moral hazard, thereby further increasing costs and the resulting gap 
between potential policyholders’ risk aversion and the price that insurers must 
charge for insurance insurance. 
In this Article I engage in something of a mental experiment in order to see 
where this way of thinking about the potential insurance insurance features of the 
regulation of insurance might take us. For purposes of the Article, the notion of 
insurance insurance is more nearly a heuristic than a theory about insurance 
coverage or insurance regulation. I use the notion as a lens through which to bring 
certain inherent limits on the regulatory enterprise from the background to the 
foreground. If this results in a richer understanding of the subject, then the mental 
experiment will have been a success. 
Part I briefly sets the stage by discussing the role of insurance within the set 
of mechanisms that may be used to handle the risk of loss. Part II identifies and 
analyzes a variety of different forms of existing regulation, seeking to show how 
 
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-4 (2012). 
3. I first saw this phrase in a cartoon by Jack Ziegler—“And, for what we don’t cover, there’s 
insurance insurance.” See Nathan Heller, Bay Watched, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 14, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/10/14/bay-watched; Jack Ziegler, New Yorker Cartoon, 
CONDÉ NAST COLLECTION, http://www.condenaststore.com/-sp/And-for-what-we-don-t-cover-
there-s-insurance-insurance-New-Yorker-Cartoon-Prints_i9896618_.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2015). 
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they can be understood to generate insurance insurance. Part III then turns to five 
aspects of the availability and reliability of insurance about which policyholders also 
are risk averse and for which insurance insurance would therefore in principle be 
desirable. This Part shows why these aspects of insurance insurance are more 
difficult for administrative and judicial regulation to address, analyzing how and why 
this is the case. 
I. THE PLACE OF INSURANCE INSURANCE IN THE RISK-MANAGING UNIVERSE 
Risk—the possibility of suffering a loss—is pervasive. A wide variety of 
devices “manage” risk.4 I use this term because it reflects the fact that these devices 
not only take different forms, but also that the devices operate in different ways. 
Some reduce risk or avoid it.5 Others, including insurance, transfer or spread risk.6 
The paradox of insurance is that, by reducing the loss that may be suffered by 
any given insured party, insurance may increase the actual risk of loss. This is the 
familiar moral hazard that can be created by insurance.7 Insurance and risk reduction 
can be complements rather than substitutes, however, when insurance is devised so 
as to combat moral hazard.8 In a perfect world, insurance would cover only those 
risks that could not be cost-effectively eliminated through other means. Then 
insureds would have optimal incentives to eliminate risk, and insurance would be 
available only for the residue of risk that remained. 
Three factors, cutting in different directions, render this ideal impossible to 
achieve. First, insurance is able, only imperfectly, to combat moral hazard. Some 
losses that might otherwise have been cost-effectively avoided, therefore, occur 
nonetheless. Insurance then costs more than it would cost if it could perfectly 
combat moral hazard. As a result, there is less demand for insurance than there 
would be in the absence of moral hazard, and less insurance is purchased. 
Second, potential insureds posing higher than average risk may 
disproportionately seek insurance. If insurers cannot identify and charge these 
applicants accordingly, then adverse selection may occur and lower risk insureds 
may disproportionately decline to purchase insurance.9 This too reduces demand 
for insurance. 
Third, however, insureds are risk averse. They are therefore willing to pay 
premiums that exceed the expected value of the risk they pose. This means that 
there is more demand for insurance than there would be in the absence of risk 
aversion. As a consequence, the reduction in demand resulting from moral hazard 
and adverse selection may be completely or partially offset by risk aversion. 
All this may affect insurance insurance in the following ways. On the one hand, 
 
4. See ALEXANDER J. MCNEIL ET AL., QUANTITATIVE RISK MANAGEMENT 471–93 (2005). 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 7. 
8. Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. ECON. 541 (1979). 
9. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
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regulatory efforts to make insurance more available or reliable may sometimes 
increase moral hazard and adverse selection, thereby undermining existing 
insurance and making risk reduction, or risk spreading through other means, more 
attractive than they would otherwise be. For example, those who might otherwise 
have insured may hedge,10 increase their risk of bankruptcy,11 or rely more heavily 
on publicly provided insurance or risk protection instead of private insurance.12 
There is even some very limited express insurance insurance sold in the market.13 
On the other hand, risk aversion may be sufficient to partially or completely 
overcome the moral hazard and adverse selection generated by a particular form of 
regulation, thereby making insurance in the face of such regulation feasible, despite 
the increased risk of moral hazard and adverse selection. The question will then be 
whether these effects are worth tolerating in order to generate insurance insurance. 
II. FORMS OF INSURANCE INSURANCE 
A variety of administrative and judicial forms of regulation can be understood 
as directed at assuring the availability14 or reliability of insurance. 
A. Administrative Regulation 
In a sense, much administrative regulation is a form of insurance. Regulation 
of the securities markets, public utilities, and consumer products, for example, helps 
to assure the availability and reliability of these objects of regulation. Regulation is 
likely to raise the cost of the products in question. This increased cost, often paid 
 
10. A hedge is a transaction that creates the possibility that a gain will be produced whenever a 
loss occurs. If the price of wheat rises whenever there is a flood, then the risk of flood damage can be 
hedged by purchasing wheat futures. A hedge of this sort does not literally reduce the probability that 
a loss will occur, but it does reduce the net economic effect when the loss occurs. In this sense, hedging 
resembles both risk reduction and risk spreading. 
11. In effect, a party that becomes insolvent because it suffers a loss or losses spreads the loss 
among its creditors. Each creditor who is unable to recover the full amount of the debt owed to it 
(including tort creditors) bears a share of the shortfall that results from the loss. Unlike other forms of 
risk transfer or spreading, however, which occur pre-loss, transfer or spreading through bankruptcy 
occurs post-loss. 
12. The form of spreading that takes place through this approach varies. If benefits—for 
example, provided by FEMA in the event of disaster—are paid out of general revenues, then the loss 
is spread among all taxpayers. On the other hand, if those provided benefits have paid premiums for 
government insurance—as in the case of Medicare, for example—then risk is spread among all 
premium payers, though not necessarily in proportion to premiums paid, because premium structures 
themselves may anticipate some intergenerational spreading. 
13. Insurance broker Swett & Crawford offers “Claims Dispute Insurance” on behalf of NAS 
Insurance Services and Lloyd’s of London. Susanne Sclafane, New Product Tackles Uninsured Risk of 
Coverage Denial, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360° (June 30, 2008), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/ 
2008/06/30/new-product-tackles-uninsured-risk-of-coverage-denials. “We know that wrongful 
coverage denials occur in our industry,” said Swett & Crawford managing director Jason White. Id. 
Insurance against wrongful denials is needed because businesses that are wrongfully denied coverage 
by their insurers often cannot find lawyers to take their cases; even simple cases can cost $50,000 to 
litigate and complicated cases twice that, making litigation financially impractical. Id. 
14. Because affordability may be considered an aspect of availability, I do not consider 
affordability separately in what follows. 
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by purchasers in the form of a higher price, is effectively an insurance premium 
designed to render these products more available or reliable. 
Similarly, much administrative regulation of insurance is designed at some 
level to ensure the availability or reliability of insurance. This occurs in three ways. 
First, regulation may directly mandate that insurance be available. Statutorily created 
residual market mechanisms, such as auto liability insurance assigned risk plans and 
joint underwriting associations in a number of different fields, help to fill gaps in 
market-provided insurance, typically subject to premium ceilings.15 At the federal 
level, the ACA requires health insurers selling coverage on insurance exchanges to 
accept all applications, places severe limits on medical underwriting, and mandates 
guaranteed renewability.16 All of these devices provide insurance insurance, not 
simply by making insurance available in the first instance, but also by protecting 
insureds against the risk that there will be changes in their insurability after their 
insurance policies expire. 
Second, regulation may provide insurance insurance indirectly by setting 
standards or threatening fines or penalties in a manner that increases the probability 
that insurance will be available or reliable. For example, solvency regulation makes 
it more likely that insurers will have the resources to pay valid claims.17 State-enacted 
versions of the Model Unfair Insurance Practices Act enable the imposition of 
penalties on insurers that engage in a pattern of misleading marketing or claims 
processing conduct.18 The threat of penalties creates incentives for insurers to 
process claims fairly. Statutes awarding extracontractual damages to individual 
claimants for “bad faith” claims handling have the same effect.19 
Third, regulation may provide for an alternative source of payment in the 
event that insurance does not pay a valid claim. State insurance guaranty funds, for 
example, ensure that insurance provided even by an insolvent insurer is secure, up 
to a statutory maximum per claim, by providing claimants payment out of the 
fund.20 
B. Common Law Judicial Regulation 
The common law of insurance consists of a vast body of doctrines. I do not 
contend that the purpose of a substantial percentage of these doctrines is to provide 
insurance insurance. Nonetheless, there are important doctrines that have precisely 
this effect. I will discuss four such doctrines here. 
The first three doctrines create insurance insurance indirectly by threatening 
insurers with liability in a manner that makes insurance more reliable. For example, 
 
15. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 149–50. 
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-1, -4 (2012). 
17. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 113–16. 
18. Id. at 147. 
19. See ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 
170 (5th ed. 2012). 
20. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 122–23. 
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the imposition of liability for extracontractual damages on insurers for bad faith 
denial of claims creates an incentive for insurers to ensure that they do not 
wrongfully deny coverage claims.21 This makes insurance more reliable. Indeed, 
because liability for a multiple of the amount due under a policy may be imposed in 
a bad faith suit, insurers probably pay some marginal claims that are not in fact 
covered. The result of this doctrine therefore is not only to provide a version of 
insurance insurance but in doing so also to extend what amounts to coverage to 
some noncovered claims. 
A second doctrine that has the effect of ensuring the reliability of coverage is 
the rule—adopted in a series of jurisdictions—that breach of the duty to defend 
estops the insurer from denying coverage of claims that should have been 
defended.22 The threat that the insurer will have to pay uncovered claims if it 
wrongfully refuses to defend surely induces insurers to defend some claims that they 
would not otherwise defend. The effect of the rule is therefore to ensure that the 
defense insurance provided by liability insurance policies is actually available. 
A third doctrine that promotes reliable insurance is the liability insurer’s duty 
to settle. Under this doctrine, a liability insurer that rejects a reasonable offer to 
settle for a sum that falls within the limits of liability of its policy is liable for the full 
amount of any ensuing judgment against its insured, including any portion of the 
judgment that exceeds the policy’s limits of liability.23 The threat of above-limits 
liability surely induces insurers to accept some offers to settle that they would not 
otherwise accept, thus making the insurance against liability that it provides more 
reliable. 
My fourth example is a doctrine that directly helps to assure the availability of 
insurance. This is contra proferentem, a canon of construction mandating that 
ambiguous insurance policy language be interpreted against the drafter. Since the 
drafter of insurance policies is almost always the insurer, for practical purposes this 
means that ambiguous policy language is construed in favor of coverage.24 The 
obvious consequence of the doctrine is to make coverage more secure whenever it 
is reasonably debatable whether the policy provides it. This is, in effect, insurance 
insurance. 
I have provided this selective list of features of administrative and judicial 
regulation of insurance in order to demonstrate that these forms of regulation—
and probably others that I have not identified—can readily be understood to create, 
or attempt to create, insurance insurance. Proper assessment of this positive thesis 
regarding the phenomenon of insurance insurance, however, also requires an 
understanding of the limits of regulation designed to provide insurance insurance. 
In the following Part, I make a start at providing such an understanding by 
 
21. Id. at 93. 
22. Id. at 586–87. 
23. Id. at 614–15. 
24. Id. at 41. 
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identifying five respects in which there are severe limits of the possibility of 
insurance insurance. 
III. FIVE LIMITS ON INSURANCE INSURANCE 
The insight behind the notion of insurance insurance is that, because insureds 
are risk averse, they are averse to the risk that insurance they seek may be unavailable 
or unreliable. They may therefore wish insurance of their insurance, not only in the 
ways I identified in Part I, but in other ways as well. In this Part, I analyze five ways 
that insureds may be risk averse about insurance, but which generate challenges that 
make providing insurance insurance difficult or impossible. Such difficulties make 
regulation designed to generate these forms of insurance insurance difficult as well. 
A. Unpredictable Risk 
Insurance thrives on statistical predictability. Risks whose frequency and 
severity are unpredictable therefore are more difficult to insure than predictable 
risks. Yet potential insureds are likely to be at least as averse to unpredictable as to 
predictable risks. Consequently, in theory, insurance against the risk that a risk may 
be unpredictable and therefore difficult to insure might be desirable. 
Risks that may be unpredictable to individual insured parties can be insured 
when insurers can predict the aggregate risk of loss posed by those in their insurance 
pools. In the absence of data regarding total risk, selling insurance is more like 
gambling than insuring. In principle, however, even comparatively unpredictable 
risks should be insurable, as long as insureds are sufficiently more averse to them 
than insurers, whose capacity to diversify risk should make them less averse to 
unpredictable risk than any individual insured. 
It is precisely because of policyholders’ risk aversion, however, that this is not 
necessarily or always the case. Insurers who cover an unpredictable risk are 
vulnerable to insolvency. And policyholders naturally are risk averse regarding the 
possibility of an insurer’s insolvency. The more unpredictable the risk an insurer 
might be willing to cover, the less attractive that insurance will be to policyholders 
because of the insurer’s insolvency risk. 
Insurers might include an unpredictability surcharge in their premiums in 
order to reduce their risk of insolvency, but this cuts two ways. On the one hand, 
the additional assets produced by the surcharge reduce the risk of insolvency. On 
the other hand, coverage will be less attractive to policyholders to the extent that 
premiums are higher because they include an unpredictability surcharge. 
Unpredictability may therefore create a gap between the premiums insurers must 
charge and the premiums policyholders are willing to pay, thus rendering 
unpredictable risks uninsurable in practice. Voluntarily offered insurance of 
unpredictable risks may therefore not be workable. For the same reason, mandating 
that insurers offer insurance against a risk or risks that are unpredictable will not 
necessarily mean that policyholders will purchase that coverage. 
In contrast, although mandating both that insurers offer and policyholders 
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purchase coverage will result in the sale of coverage, such a mandate may have 
undesirable side effects. First, potential policyholders may violate the purchase 
mandate, either escaping enforcement or paying whatever fine or penalty is imposed 
for violation. Some car owners do not purchase liability insurance, despite a 
requirement that they do so. The ACA expressly permits paying a tax penalty for 
noncompliance with the individual mandate to purchase health insurance.25 Second, 
insurers may be permitted or attempt to charge sufficiently high premiums that 
policyholders balk at paying them and demand rate regulation that artificially 
depresses premiums, thus increasing insolvency risk. Alternatively, premiums may 
be permitted to rise, and policyholders may decrease their involvement in activities 
that are subject to coverage in order to minimize or avoid paying the premiums in 
question. Obstetricians required by hospitals to purchase malpractice insurance may 
cease delivering babies, for example. 
The foregoing analysis assumes that the risk of insurer insolvency is not 
cushioned by the prospect of financial backup. In theory, financial backup might 
make it more feasible for insurers to cover unpredictable risks because of the 
assurance that the prospect of such backup would provide to policyholders 
purchasing the coverage. But in practice that has been the case only to a limited 
extent. There is a system of state-based guaranty funds to which solvent insurers 
contribute in the event of an insurer’s insolvency.26 The fund then pays the claims 
of the insolvent insurer. But these funds have limited application and comparatively 
low limits on the amount of a claim that is payable by the fund.27 The result is that 
risk-averse potential policyholders are not guaranteed that insurance of 
unpredictable risks will be fully paid in the event that the insurer covering the risk 
becomes insolvent. 
The backup protection provided by guaranty funds could be expanded so as 
to reduce policyholders’ concern about the solvency of individual insurers that 
covered unpredictable risks. But this very expansion would increase the exposure 
of insurers that did not cover unpredictable risks to the possibility of insolvency. 
Guaranty fund protection puts the assets of noninsolvent insurers behind insolvent 
insurers. The effect of expanding guaranty fund protection, therefore, would be to 
diversify the risk of insolvency resulting from individual insurers covering 
unpredictable risks across the entire market. But to the extent that all insurers 
covered the same unpredictable risk or risks, these risks would likely be correlated 
and diversification would be defeated. 
Reinsurance is an alternative method of spreading the risk of any given 
insurer’s insolvency to the global financial markets. But reinsurance is almost always 
incomplete. No reinsurer will cover all of a particular risk. Rather, reinsurance 
typically covers a quota share (percentage) of an insurer’s exposure under a policy 
 
25. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(3) (2012). 
26. The National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds: Supporting a System of Policyholder Protection, 
NCIGF, http://ncigf.org/ [http://perma.cc/3TA3-5CKP] (last visited July 12, 2015). 
27. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 122–23. 
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or set of policies, or it covers all exposure excess of a particular monetary exposure 
under a policy or set of policies, up to a specified limit of liability.28 The result is 
that all unpredictable risk under a particular policy or set of policies usually cannot 
and could not be reinsured. Reinsurance therefore cannot eliminate the risk of an 
insurer’s insolvency. In any event, reinsurers themselves face the risk of insolvency 
when they reinsure unpredictable risks. Policyholders of fully reinsured insurers 
therefore cannot count on the solvency of reinsurers, though the more broadly an 
insurer’s coverage responsibility is spread among a succession or reinsurance and 
retrocession, the more diversified is the risk of insolvency. If all insurers cover 
unpredictable risk and reinsure a significant portion of that risk, however, then the 
risk of insolvency is likely to be correlated, and the assurance that the presence of 
reinsurance would otherwise provide policyholder would be diminished or 
eliminated. 
Perhaps more importantly, reinsurance can provide policyholders with 
reassurance that insurers have diversified their risk of insolvency only if information 
regarding the availability of reinsurance of the risk to particular insurers is publicly 
available. Without the information necessary to reassure prospective policyholders, 
they will still be reluctant to pay the premiums that insurers would have to charge 
in order to cover unpredictable risk. Some reinsurance information is publicly 
available in the form of submissions of financial information made by individual 
insurers to state insurance commissioners.29 But this tends to be insufficiently 
detailed for this purpose. It is available at most by line of insurance, without the 
level of particularity that would be necessary to reassure individual potential 
policyholders. In my experience, individual insurers otherwise guard reinsurance 
information fairly closely in order to shield the information from litigants in 
coverage disputes. The result is that the assurance that might be provided by more 
transparent reinsurance information is absent. 
Finally, insurance of unpredictable risks can be securitized through devices 
such as catastrophe bonds.30 Insurers covering a risk can sell bonds that pay 
investors unless loss exceeding an index or other proxy for a specified level of 
insured loss occurs. If there are enough such bonds sold covering different, 
uncorrelated losses, then investors should be able to diversify their “coverage” of 
these unpredictable but uncorrelated risks.31 In this way, the risk of unpredictable 
loss can be spread through the global financial markets. 
This possibility suggests how far it could be necessary to go in order to cover 
a substantial amount of unpredictable risk. Compared to its multitrillion dollar 
 
28. DANIEL W. GERBER ET AL., 7 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION 
§ 71.02[4] (2014). 
29. See, e.g., Reinsurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Nov. 2014), http://web.archive.org/web/2015
0423071225/http://www.iii.org/issue-update/reinsurance [http://perma.cc/L7DJ-AUKB]. 
30. J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss, Convergence of Insurance and Financial Markets: Hybrid and 
Securitized Risk-Transfer Solutions, 76 J. RISK & INS. 493, 494 (2009). 
31. Id. 
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potential, the market for catastrophe bonds, which has gotten off the ground only 
in recent decades, has been minuscule.32 Whether at some point it will more 
substantially address unpredictable risk is an open question. In the meantime, 
however, providing insurance insurance in this area will pose a very significant 
challenge. 
B. Reclassification Risk 
One of the risks that insurance purchasers face is that their risk of loss, and 
therefore premiums for future coverage, will increase. Risk-averse parties could wish 
to insure against this “reclassification risk,”33 perhaps in the form of guaranteed 
renewable insurance. For example, manufacturers with products liability insurance 
might want to insure against the risk that a product they market will turn out to 
cause a disease that the product previously was not known to cause, thereby 
increasing their risk levels. Drivers with auto liability insurance might want to insure 
against the risk that the incidence of auto accidents in the area where they live will 
increase—perhaps because of increased population density—thereby increasing 
their risk levels. And homeowners might want to insure against the risk that climate 
change will increase their risk of incurring damage from hurricane-force wind. 
Three forms of insurance currently cover reclassification risk in this fashion 
through what amounts to guaranty renewability. Life insurers and long-term care 
insurers commit to renewing policies for specified, extended periods—often twenty 
or more years—as long as the policyholder pays predetermined premiums. In doing 
so, the policyholder shifts to the insurer the risk that his or her health status—and 
therefore his or her risk of dying or of needing long-term care—will change during 
the period of guaranteed renewability. 
In health insurance, as I noted in Part I, the ACA mandates guaranteed 
renewal of health insurance.34 In addition, the ACA prohibits medical 
underwriting—with the exception of basing premiums on age, territory of 
residence, tobacco use, and participation in a “wellness program”—and risk 
classification based on health status.35 As a consequence, health insurers bear 
virtually all the risk that a policyholder’s health status will change over time. This 
was far from the case, however, prior to the enactment of the ACA.36 It might even 
 
32. Id. at 516–17. 
33. Kenneth S. Abraham & Pierre-André Chiappori, Classification Risk and Its Regulation, in LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE (Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman eds., forthcoming 2015). 
34. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 300gg-4 (2012). 
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-1, -4. 
36. HIPPA required health insurers to renew policies that were subject to this law, but imposed 
no limits on what insures could charge for renewals. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41. And there were few 
restrictions on medical underwriting or risk classification based on health status. It was my observation 
that some state laws were more restrictive, and some health insurers voluntarily guaranteed renewal, 
but at most there was a patchwork quilt of protections that did not amount to general, guaranteed 
renewability. 
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be said that one of the principal purposes of the ACA is to ensure that health 
insurance covers reclassification risk. 
In other lines of insurance, however, the challenge of offering coverage of 
reclassification risk, or of legally requiring coverage of reclassification risk, is 
substantial. A series of factors places limits on the insurability of reclassification risk. 
1. Moral Hazard 
Some of the risks that insurance covers are partly within the control of 
policyholders. A driver can influence his propensity to cause accidents by exercising 
greater care, by driving fewer miles, or by doing both. A homeowner with a leaky 
roof can influence the risk that his home will be damaged by fire by replacing the 
roof with fire-resistant material. It would not be in the interest of policyholders or 
insurers to insure the risk that these, and the many other risks that are wholly or 
partly within the control of policyholders, will change. There would be too much 
moral hazard associated with such insurance. 
But increase in some risks is either against the interest of policyholders or 
largely beyond their control. The most obvious example is change in health status. 
Becoming injured or sick is not in the interest of policyholders. Some people are 
more careful with their health than others, but in general people try to avoid injury 
and illness. Moreover, many health risks are not in people’s control at all. The risk 
that I will develop a brain tumor is outside my control. It is no surprise then that 
reclassification risk is covered by life insurance, long-term care insurance, and health 
insurance subject to the ACA. The question is why insurers have not identified other 
risks that are not subject to moral hazard and offered coverage of reclassification 
risk in connection with these risks. Additional explanations are therefore necessary. 
2. Unpredictability 
In the previous Section, I noted the difficulties associated with insuring against 
unpredictable risks. The magnitude of the risk changes that could be involved in 
insuring reclassification risk would sometimes be extremely difficult to predict. 
Moreover, the longer the period of time over which renewability was guaranteed, 
the greater the prediction difficulties insurers would encounter. Without a workable 
means of determining what premium to charge for covering this risk, insurers would 
be taking a shot in the dark. The more reclassification risk they covered, or—what 
amounts to nearly the same thing—the longer the period of time during which they 
covered reclassification risk, the more they would be risking severe unprofitability 
or insolvency. 
As in covering unpredictable risks generally, the tendency of insurers covering 
reclassification risk, especially long term reclassification risk, would therefore be to 
add a surcharge to premiums to cushion them against unpredictable contingency. 
The higher the premiums charged, however, the more averse to unpredictable risk 
potential insureds must be in order to find insurance attractive. 
The situations in which reclassification risk is covered help to bear out these 
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points. In life insurance there is only one risk insured—the risk of death. Insurers’ 
long experience with and detailed statistics regarding mortality rates make the 
predictions necessary to provide guaranteed life insurance to an individual over a 
period of decades completely feasible. And guaranteed renewability of health 
insurance under the ACA is feasible because, as I indicated earlier, this legislation 
prohibits most risk classification.37 With virtually no risk classification permitted, 
there is virtually no reclassification risk and therefore little or no unpredictability of 
operationally relevant risk changes. 
Other lines of insurance do not fit the life or health insurance patterns. For 
example, physicians, attorneys, and other professionals face career-long liability 
insurance reclassification risk. Malpractice insurance was once dominated by 
occurrence coverage, under which coverage is “triggered,” or activated, by the 
occurrence of bodily injury or property damage during the policy period, no matter 
when a suit alleging liability for this injury or damage is brought.38 This provided 
coverage of “long-tail” liability.39 In providing such coverage, the insurer effectively 
undertook to cover the risk of long-term change in the incidence and magnitude of 
malpractice liability. For practical purposes, this was insurance against 
reclassification risk based on difficult-to-predict legal and economic change. 
As soon as the rate of legal and economic change became less predictable in 
the mid-1970s, malpractice insurers shifted from occurrence to claims-made 
coverage, which insures liability only for claims made during the policy period.40 
The move to claims made thereby shifted back to policyholders most of the 
reclassification risk that occurrence policies had previously covered. For analogous 
reasons—the difficulty of predicting the magnitude and rate of change in long-tail 
toxic tort, products, and pollution liability, the same phenomenon occurred in 
Commercial General Liability (CGL) insurance in the mid-1980s.41 Through policy 
revisions, insurers have attempted to curtail the amount of long-tail liability covered 
by CGL insurance policies.42 
3. Correlated Risk 
A third reason that insurers do not offer—and insurance law cannot effectively 
mandate that insurance of reclassification risk be offered—is that much such risk is 
correlated. There are any number of correlated reclassification risks; some examples 
include changes in the scope of tort liability, climate change, and increased auto 
accident rates in a particular territory or among a particular class of policyholders. 
Change in mortality rates is also correlated and therefore a potential threat to life 
 
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-41a. 
38. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 170–71 (5th ed. 2010). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 160. 
42. In addition to selling claims-made policies, these include the “absolute” pollution exclusion 
and the “Montrose” clause, which attempts to preclude triggering multiple successive CGL insurance 
policies. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 439, sec. I(1)(c), at 441, sec. I(2)(f ). 
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insurers. But over the past 150 years life expectancies have increased, so the 
correlation has benefitted life insurers, since the result has been that payouts have 
been extended beyond the time when the life insurers had predicted they would be 
due. 
Consequently, if there was to be insurance against reclassification risk, it would 
have to be defined so as not to include correlated risks. General guaranteed renewal, 
however, would cover renewed insurance of all risks that might otherwise have been 
reclassified, whether correlated or not. For this reason, for any line of insurance 
subject to significantly correlated reclassification risk, guaranteed renewability 
would not be feasible. Rather, specification of which reclassification risks were and 
were not covered or guaranteed renewable would be necessary. 
The extent to which this would be feasible, however, is unclear. Perhaps 
specifying and covering a few major reclassification risks would be feasible. But 
providing an extensive list of covered and excluded reclassification risks in standard-
form insurance policies would be cumbersome and undesirable. 
4. Adverse Selection 
Efforts to insure reclassification risk also would be plagued by a particular sort 
of adverse selection. Policies that were guaranteed renewable across the board or 
that insured particular reclassification risks would be disproportionately purchased 
by those who believe they are at above-average risk of experiencing increased risk 
levels. And those who believe they are at below-average risk of experiencing 
increased risk levels, or believe that their risk levels will decline, would 
disproportionately decline to purchase reclassification coverage. Moreover, even if 
there were a mandate that coverage of reclassification risk be provided automatically, 
parties whose risk levels did not increase over time might be able to save money by 
switching insurers. These insurers would have to provide the parties reclassification 
coverage going forward but would not have to charge the parties the same premium 
rates that they had been paying their previous insurers.43 
Life insurers face an analogous problem even though life insurance is 
guaranteed renewable.44 In any given group of policyholders who purchase long-
term life insurance, those who experience adverse changes in their health status are 
more likely to continue to pay for their life insurance each year, whereas those who 
remain healthy are less likely to continue to pay their annual insurance bills. Those 
in this latter group have “lapsed.” The lapse rate is partly a reflection of this sort of 
adverse selection, and the prospect that lapses will occur is something life insurers 
must take into account in setting premiums for long-term insurance. Only the risk 
aversion of even healthy policyholders prevents life insurance from unraveling for 
this reason. 
 
43. See Abraham & Chiappori, supra note 33, at 15. 
44. See TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 201–02 (3d ed. 2013). 
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5. Inadequate Risk Aversion and Consequent Insufficient Demand 
Despite all the obstacles I have just discussed, in theory, there might 
nonetheless be possible gains in social utility if insurers rather than policyholders 
shouldered some reclassification risk. But for this to be the case, policyholder 
demand resulting from risk aversion would have to dominate insurers’ reluctance 
and resulting increased premiums to insure that risk. The fact that most 
policyholders have not in their experience suffered enormously from 
reclassifications renders this unlikely as a general matter. In my experience, based 
on years of observation, large premium increases for policy renewals usually do not 
occur. Policyholders therefore probably are not willing to pay what insurers would 
charge to insure reclassification risk, or more such coverage would be offered. Most 
ordinary individuals probably are not sufficiently concerned about future increases 
in their auto or homeowners insurance premiums to want coverage against the risk 
that their increases would be substantial. Indeed, insurers typically sell only one-year 
policies, and policyholders seem to exhibit little or no demand for policies of longer 
duration. The inference that there is a gap between what policyholders would pay 
for longer-term coverage or for other some measure of protection against 
reclassification risk and what insurance would have to charge for such protection 
seems strong. This may not be an obstacle to covering reclassification risk in 
principle, but in practice it seems to have been a significant obstacle. 
C. Coverage Uncertainty 
A number of the regulatory devices discussed in Part I address the reliability 
of insurance coverage. A related concern for insureds is that the incapacity of 
language to perfectly convey meaning and intention results in uncertainty about the 
scope of coverage provided by insurance policies. One of the risks associated with 
buying insurance is therefore that particular losses will not be covered. Of course, 
there is a vast universe of risks that are not covered by any particular insurance 
policy. Homeowners insurance does not cover collision damage to a car; auto 
liability insurance does not cover medical malpractice liability. 
On the other hand, in connection with any insurance policy there is a range of 
losses regarding whose coverage ordinary individuals, and sometimes even 
sophisticated businesses, would reasonably be uncertain. What kinds of water 
damage and tree damage does my homeowner’s policy cover and exclude? If my 
child throws something out the window of my car while it is moving, is any resulting 
liability covered? If my company is ordered to contribute to the cost of cleaning up 
the local landfill, does my CGL insurance policy cover this cost? 
The possibility that certain potentially insured losses actually are not covered 
by an insurance policy is itself something about which policyholders in the aggregate 
would naturally be risk averse. This should create an opportunity for insurance 
against the risk of not being insured against the set of risks whose coverage is 
uncertain. 
Because the uncertainty problem arises from the infirmity of language, 
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however, uncertainty cannot be completely eliminated with additional language. 
Any insurance against the risk of noninsurance would itself be subject to an 
analogous sort of secondary uncertainty as to the scope of the coverage it provided 
and so on. To the extent that insurers are risk averse regarding coverage uncertainty, 
they can purchase reinsurance that partially protects them. Reinsurance typically 
circumvents some of the uncertainty problem by providing that the reinsurer shall 
“follow the fortunes” of the insurer. Such a provision requires that if the insurer 
pays the policyholder, then the reinsurer pays the insurer up to the amount of 
promised reinsurance. But of course reinsurance contracts are subject to some 
uncertainty risk themselves. This is a problem that neither insurance nor insurance 
law can solve directly, although the problem is mitigated by the doctrine of contra 
proferentem, as I described in Part I. 
There is little reason to suppose that any individual judicial interpretation 
directly reduces policyholders’ uncertainty about the scope of coverage they have. 
Insurance law surely does not translate into policyholder understandings in that way. 
But over time judicial decisions reduce the amount of coverage uncertainty on the 
part of the agents, brokers, and lawyers who communicate with policyholders about 
the scope of their coverage. And this process probably gives policyholders greater 
confidence that the scope of the coverage they have purchased is determinate, even 
if policyholders do not know exactly what the boundaries of coverage are in any 
given case. Moreover, the doctrine also has at least some effect on the drafting of 
policy language in the first instance. Because insurers can anticipate the application 
of contra proferentem, they have an incentive to draft provisions that are clearer than 
they might otherwise be in order to avoid application of the doctrine. This, too, 
reduces uncertainty. 
Admittedly, it is not possible for an insurer drafting a policy, or the parties to 
a coverage dispute after the policy has been issued, to predict with certainty whether 
a particular policy provision will be considered ambiguous if the provision has not 
already been authoritatively interpreted. But this uncertainty over whether contra 
proferentem will be applied is no greater than the uncertainty about how an ambiguous 
provision would be interpreted in the absence of the doctrine. The doctrine does 
not eliminate all coverage uncertainty. But the net effect of the doctrine probably is 
to create greater rather than less certainty about the scope of coverage. 
Nonetheless, an irreducible quantum of coverage uncertainty will always 
remain and will always be uninsurable. Insurance insurance cannot fully solve the 
problem. 
D. Coverage Unavailability 
One of the principal functions of markets is to satisfy preferences. But both 
the breadth and intensity of preferences influence which preferences markets can 
satisfy. Shoes are made in half sizes because, although some people’s feet would fit 
better in shoes made in quarter sizes, there is not enough demand for quarter sizes. 
There are not enough people willing to pay enough to warrant the cost of mass 
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producing shoes in quarter sizes. Therefore, only those who can afford to pay $1000 
or more for custom-made shoes can have them. 
There are analogous barriers to satisfying preferences for insurance. One of 
the principal determinants of the demand for coverage is the degree of potential 
policyholders’ risk aversion. If there is insufficient risk aversion, then insurance will 
not be available. That may be the case for a number of reasons. First, there may be 
insufficient risk aversion to support the sale of insurance either because of the 
underlying character or personality of individuals or because they have incomplete 
information about the risk in question. 
Second, if the risk in question has never been insured before, then insurers 
may have limited or no actuarial data on which to base their premium calculations. 
In such situations insurers will add larger-than-usual contingency factors to 
premiums and may therefore charge higher premiums than they would charge if 
they had better data about the risk in question. But potential policyholders’ risk 
aversion may be insufficient to yield demand for coverage at this higher price. 
Third, there may not be enough risk-averse potential policyholders to support 
the development of insurance against a risk. When there are not enough people 
willing to purchase insurance of a particular risk to permit insurers to spread the 
risk across a large enough number of policyholders, risk-transfer transactions will 
not have all the characteristics of insurance. Under such circumstances, insuring the 
risk in question is more like entrepreneurship or venture capital investing than 
insuring. If there are only a few people or entities facing the risk of suffering a 
comparatively large risk, then the risk may be handled in one of those domains. On 
the other hand, when there is a fairly widespread risk of suffering a comparatively 
small loss, and there is a prospect that demand will eventually be substantial enough, 
insurers may begin to offer coverage anyway. That is how innovation in insurance 
often occurs. 
When this does not occur and insurance against a risk is considered desirable 
as a matter of policy, insurance law has several options. The first is to mandate 
purchase of insurance against the risk in question. This approach is rare, but not 
unheard of. For example, most states require that registered owners of motor 
vehicles not only purchase liability insurance but also uninsured motorists (UM) 
insurance.45 There is almost certainly sufficient independent demand for auto 
liability insurance, but that is probably not true of UM insurance. I doubt that most 
people have even heard of UM insurance. 
A second approach to the problem of insufficient risk aversion is what in 
recent scholarship on incentive creation has been called a “nudge.”46 This approach 
provides insurance unless a potential policyholder opts out. For example, a few 
states require that UM insurance be provided to anyone who purchases auto liability 
 
45. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 700. 
46. See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
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insurance unless the purchaser declines UM coverage.47 A nudge of this sort helps 
to overcome the limit on insurability resulting from what would otherwise be 
insufficient risk aversion on the part of potential policyholders. 
Another sort of nudge focuses on insurers rather than policyholders. 
Interestingly, the doctrine requiring that ambiguous policy provisions be interpreted 
in favor of coverage may be viewed as an effort to promote the satisfaction of 
diverse preferences by creating possible incentives for insurers to offer coverage 
alternatives. When a policy provision is held to be ambiguous, insurers have four 
choices. First, they can redraft the provision to provide unambiguously the broader 
coverage. Second, they can retain the provision in their policies. Even if insurers do 
not redraft the provision to provide unambiguously for the broader coverage, 
insurers acting in good faith should assess claims based on the judicially adopted 
interpretation. However, the ambiguous language of the provision may deter some 
insureds from making claims, as it may have done before the provision was held to 
be ambiguous. In any event, in both situations the preference of some policyholders, 
or potential policyholders, for the narrower coverage is not satisfied. All 
policyholders receive and pay for the broader coverage, even if some would prefer 
the narrower coverage. 
Under a third approach, insurers can redraft the provision so that it 
unambiguously provides narrower coverage, possibly lowering premiums because 
of the clarification. In this situation as well, preference diversity is not served 
because the preference of policyholders or potential policyholders who prefer the 
broader coverage is not satisfied. All policyholders receive only the narrower 
coverage, although they may pay less than they were previously paying. 
Finally, insurers can redraft and offer a choice between unambiguously 
broader and unambiguously narrower coverage. Only in such a situation is there 
greater satisfaction of preferences as a result of holding a policy provision 
ambiguous. But the question is how frequently insurers, or some of them, would 
adopt this approach. If insurers could have profited from offering policyholders a 
choice between broader and narrower coverage, then in a properly operating market 
they would already have been doing so. It follows either that one or more flaws in 
the market had been preventing this or that there are insufficiently diverse 
preferences for coverage to warrant providing a choice between broader and 
narrower coverage. It is possible, for example, that applicants had assumed they 
were receiving the broad coverage and were willing to pay premiums accordingly. A 
judicial decision that the policy provision in question is ambiguous, however, would 
not alter this state of affairs. Under such circumstances it would not be in the 
interest of insurers to dispel applicants’ incorrect assumption. In the extreme case, 
insurers would redraft to provide (unambiguously) only the narrower coverage but 
continue to charge the same premiums. 
It is true that in a properly operating market this could not occur, because 
 
47. ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 700. 
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other insurers would inform applicants accurately, charge lower premiums for 
narrower coverage, and expand their market share. But we are assuming here that 
the market is not operating properly, for if it were then some insurers would have 
been taking the same steps even before a policy provision was declared ambiguous. 
It is costly to give applicants choices. The alternatives have to be explained, different 
premiums quoted, etc. If this had not been occurring before a judicial decision, then 
for the same reason it might not occur after a judicial decision, because it could still 
be too costly, given the additional profits (if any) that could be obtained by giving 
applicants a choice between broader and narrower coverage, to offer a choice. The 
additional profits that could be earned by offering a choice would depend not only 
on the cost of explaining the choice but also on the extent of some applicants’ risk 
aversion. This would determine how much more at least some applicants were 
willing to pay for the broader coverage. If an insufficient percentage of applicants 
were willing to pay a sufficiently greater premium for the broader coverage, then a 
choice would not be offered. 
We thus come up against the limits of the insurability of diverse coverage 
preferences. Even a judicial decision declaring a policy provision ambiguous will not 
necessarily—perhaps not even often—result in insurers offering policyholders a 
choice between unambiguously broader and unambiguously narrow coverage. Some 
policyholders who would prefer broader coverage, or some who prefer narrower 
coverage, may not be offered this choice. 
All this makes the simple point that it is not possible to buy, and is extremely 
difficult for regulation to require, that insurance against certain risks be available. 
Only under certain demanding conditions will this be possible. It follows that 
regulation often will be unable to promote insurance against the risk that coverage 
will be unavailable. 
E. Risk-Redistribution Risk 
Insurance almost always involves risk classification: assessment of the 
magnitude of the risk of loss posed by an insured party and the pricing of premiums 
in proportion to this risk. In this connection potential insureds face two risks. The 
first is the risk of posing a high risk and therefore of being charged a high premium. 
The second is the risk of being charged higher premiums than would be actuarially 
warranted because of discrimination against the risk group of which one is a 
member. The former is distribution risk; the latter is redistribution risk. 
Both are risks against which insureds might rationally want insurance 
insurance. In fact, the reclassification risk that I discussed above is, in a sense, a 
subset of the broader category of distribution, or classification risk, which I have 
discussed elsewhere.48 Consequently, here I will discuss redistribution risk.49 
 
48. See Abraham & Chiappori, supra note 33. 
49. In fact, when a risk class is being charged more for coverage than another risk class, 
eliminating the distinction between the classes is risk redistributional for both classes, though in 
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To analyze redistribution risk, we can begin with a baseline: what a particular 
group of policyholders would be charged for insurance in the absence of regulatory 
intervention. Of course, insurance is at least minimally redistributional even when 
not compared to a baseline of nonregulated risk classification. This is because of 
the cost and resulting imprecision of classification. For practical purposes, those 
who pose a similar but not identical risk are placed in the same class. Within the 
class, however, there is always a range of risk posed by different policyholders.50 In 
such a situation, risk is redistributed from those at the high end of the risk range to 
those whose risk levels are lower. To use an oversimplified and stylized example, if 
everyone who poses between a 1 in 100,000 and 1.25 in 100,000 chance of suffering 
a loss is charged the same premium, then risk is partially redistributed from those 
in the latter group to those in the former group. 
Risk redistribution of this sort is a side effect of the economics of risk 
classification. Risk classification is cost effective only up to the point at which its 
economic benefit to the insurer of further classification is greater than its cost. 
Beyond this point, further refinement of risk classes and decreased variance within 
classes are not worth the cost involved in achieving them. The result is at least some 
risk redistribution with risk classification categories.51 
In contrast to these usually modest risk-redistributional side effects of risk 
classification undertaken by insurers, insurance law and regulation sometime 
prohibit certain forms of risk classification and thereby redistribute risk. State 
insurance commissioners have the authority to ensure that rates are not “unfairly 
discriminatory,” and state statutes often prohibit the use of specific variables in 
pricing insurance.52 Some states, for example, prohibit risk classification based on 
race or religion.53 It is likely that, before such classification was prohibited, it did 
not have actuarial support and, when it did occur, it occurred because of prejudice. 
Prohibiting such classifications simply changes the distribution of risk in that the 
prohibitions help to more closely align classification with the probability of loss. 
On the other hand, some classifications are prohibited despite their actuarial 
soundness, precisely in order to accomplish risk redistribution. A Hawaii statute, for 
example, prohibits basing rates for auto insurance in whole or in part—among other 
things—on length of driving.54 To the extent that those with limited driving 
experience are nevertheless at greater risk of accident involvement, the result is risk 
redistribution from those with limited driving experience to those with more 
 
different directions. In the absence of other regulation, the premiums charged one class rise while the 
premiums charged the other class fall. We can therefore talk about these two risks together. 
50. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 74–75 (1986). 
51. Id. at 73. 
52. See ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 1, at 111, 133–35. 
53. See Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination Laws, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 
195, 239 (2014) (“[O]nly ten states have forbidden the use of race, national origin, and religion across 
all lines of insurance.”). 
54. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10C-207 (West 2008). 
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experience. Similarly, some states prohibit auto insurers from risk classifying based 
on gender.55 To the extent that women have fewer accidents than men, such a 
prohibition redistributes risk from men to women. Regulatory attempts to 
accomplish risk redistribution, however, can be undermined by adverse selection, 
moral hazard, and—in an especially interesting way—interactions between the two. 
1. Risk Redistribution and Adverse Selection 
Ordinarily, adverse selection is the result of asymmetric information. A similar 
effect can be produced even when there is symmetric information about risk levels 
or insurers possess more information than applicants, however, if insurers are 
precluded from using the information they do possess. When a particular risk 
classification would accurately reflect policyholders’ risk levels but insurers are 
prohibited from using that classification in setting premiums, then applicants whose 
premiums would be higher in the absence of the prohibition may disproportionately 
seek insurance coverage.56 And those whose premiums would be lower in the 
absence of the prohibition may disproportionately not seek coverage. 
Insurance law’s capacity to accomplish risk redistribution is thus limited by the 
potential for attempts at redistribution to promote adverse selection. The amount 
of adverse selection that occurs will be a function of several factors. The first factor 
is the degree to which information about risk levels is asymmetric. Obviously, the 
more risk-related information insurers are able to obtain about potential 
policyholders, the greater insurers’ capacity to identify the risk levels posed by 
individual parties, and the greater insurers’ ability to combat adverse selection 
through accurate risk classification and pricing. 
The second factor is the degree of different policyholders’ risk aversion. The 
less risk averse high risk parties are, the less likely they are to disproportionately seek 
insurance, even when the insurance is underpriced given their actual risk levels. 
Conversely, the more risk averse low-risk parties are, the more likely they are to seek 
insurance even when it is overpriced given their actual risk levels. Indeed, to the 
extent that risk aversion is part of a cluster of consistent characteristics, it is possible 
that high-risk parties will be less risk averse than low-risk parties. The former’s 
comparatively lower concern with risk may be part of what makes them pose higher 
risk, whereas the latter’s comparatively greater concern with risk may be what makes 
them pose lower risk.57 Intuitively, it is plausible that those who are careful behave 
 
55. Avraham et al., supra note 53, at 241, 245. 
56. For reasons I noted earlier in discussing classification based on race and religion, the 
converse is also the case. When insurers use a classification that does not have actuarial support, 
prohibiting use of this classification will result in less adverse selection. Why might insurers engage in 
this economically irrational practice? Prejudice is one explanation. For example, hypothetically, insurers 
might classify on the basis of race or sexual orientation, either because of animus or because of the 
mistaken belief that racial minorities or gays and lesbians pose higher risk than whites or straights. 
Prohibiting classification on this basis would tend to neutralize any adverse selection that had been 
occurring because of these classification practices. 
57. David M. Cutler et al., Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of 
Abraham_production read v2 (clean) (Do Not Delete) 8/9/2015 11:05 AM 
2015] RISK AVERSION 533 
with greater care than others because they are risk averse and that as a result they 
have fewer accidents. Similarly, it is intuitively plausible that those who are careless 
are less concerned with the possibility of suffering loss and that they therefore have 
more accidents. These same greater or lesser degrees of aversion to risk would cause 
the former group to seek insurance more than might otherwise be expected and the 
latter group to seek insurance less than might otherwise be expected, and for these 
differences to partially neutralize any adverse selection that might otherwise have 
occurred because of insurers’ inability to identify those in each group. 
The third factor affecting adverse selection is the capacity of insurers to offer 
coverage choices that may neutralize the selection effect by separating those who 
are and are not at high risk of suffering a loss. For example, by offering high and 
low deductible alternatives, insurers may be able to differentiate those who are at 
greater risk of suffering loss from those who choose the low deductible alternative.58 
In view of the capacity of adverse selection to undermine efforts at risk 
redistribution, other things being equal we should expect risk-redistributional 
regulation to be more feasible in lines of insurance where there is comparatively less 
asymmetric information, and—because of risk aversion—demand for coverage is 
inelastic. Correspondingly, other things being equal we should expect risk-
redistributional regulation to be less feasible where there is comparatively more 
asymmetric information, and demand for coverage is elastic because there is, in 
general, less risk aversion. 
Regulatory practices confirm this. Auto insurers have considerable data about 
risk levels posed by drivers with different known characteristics. In contrast, in life 
insurance some individuals have private information about their mortality risk that 
it is more difficult or costly for life insurers to obtain. Further, the more nearly 
mandatory the purchase of a particular form of insurance is, the greater the amount 
of risk redistribution that can be accomplished within it because the mandate 
removes demand elasticity from the equation. Purchasing auto liability insurance is 
mandatory, whereas purchasing life insurance is optional. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that there is more risk redistributional regulation, in the form of prohibitions on 
certain forms of risk classification, in auto liability insurance than in life insurance.59 
Similarly, the ACA nominally mandates that virtually all individuals purchase 
insurance and effectively prohibits all forms of risk classification other those based 
on geography, tobacco use, and age, thus accomplishing very substantial risk 
redistribution.60 
 
Insurance, AM. ECON. REV., May 2008, at 157, 160; Liran Einav & Amy Finkelstein, Selection in Insurance 
Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2011, at 115, 124. 
58. This is one of the core insights of the seminal study by Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 
629, 632, 634, 637–38 (1976). 
59. See Avraham, et al., supra note 53, at 251. 
60. Because there is a penalty for failing to purchase coverage that will ordinarily be less than 
the cost of coverage itself, it is expected that some low-income healthy people will prefer to pay the 
penalty and will purchase coverage only when there health declines. 
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Even when insurance is not mandatory and there is considerable risk aversion 
and demand elasticity, it may be worth tolerating adverse selection in order to 
achieve a particular redistribution of risk. Even if it were shown that race was highly 
correlated with risk in a particular line of insurance, I have no doubt that 
prohibitions on classification based on race would be maintained. On the other 
hand, where concerns about discriminatory classifications are less intense, or there 
is less value in a particular risk redistribution, the degree of adverse selection that 
could be expected if a particular prohibition were adopted may play a more 
important role in assessing the prohibition. After all, the effect of adverse selection 
is to produce less insurance for some people and entities than they would otherwise 
prefer to purchase. Other things being equal, that is undesirable. In any event, the 
potential for adverse selection in a line of insurance, and the degree to which adverse 
selection is undesirable, place a constraint on the capacity of insurance law to 
effectively promote risk redistribution. 
2. Risk Redistribution and Moral Hazard 
One of the devices that insurance uses to mitigate the moral hazard it creates 
is experience rating. Under this practice, premiums are geared, among other things, 
to a policyholder’s past loss experience. The prospect that future premiums will be 
experience rated mitigates moral hazard by creating incentives for policyholders to 
avoid loss in the current policy period and thereby avoid paying experience-rated 
higher premiums in the future.61 
When premiums are risk redistributional, however, the capacity of experience 
rating to mitigate moral hazard is reduced. Any given risk classification, whether or 
not redistributional, can also be experience rated. But when the base on which 
premium rates are built undercharges some policyholders because premiums are risk 
redistributional, then the mitigation of moral hazard that is the purpose of 
experience rating may be reduced. 
The degree to which moral hazard is exacerbated by risk redistribution 
depends on the extent to which premiums are risk redistributional to begin with. 
To use a simplified example, we can think of future premiums as having two 
components—a risk-redistributional component and an experience-rated 
component. The smaller the proportion of future premiums that policyholders 
anticipate will be experience rated, the less mitigation of moral hazard that will 
occur. Conversely, the larger the proportion of future premiums that policyholders 
anticipate will be experience rated, the more mitigation of moral hazard that will 
occur. 
How much room the threat of moral hazard leaves for regulatory risk 
redistribution depends on both how much moral hazard is generated by risk 
redistribution and how much concern there is about moral hazard. Experience 
rating can be increased in order to combat moral hazard, but doing so decreases the 
 
61. ABRAHAM, supra note 50, at 75. 
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amount of risk redistribution that occurs. Alternatively, the degree to which 
premiums are risk redistributional can be kept constant, but the amount of 
policyholder self-insurance can be increased with larger deductibles, more 
coinsurance, or lower monetary limits of liability. Increased use of these devices, 
however, effectively decreases the amount of insurance provided to any given 
policyholder and therefore reduces the amount of risk redistribution that actually 
occurs. 
Similarly, just as risk-redistributional considerations vary, so concern about 
moral hazard is not monolithic. We might be much more concerned about moral 
hazard that increased the risk of bodily injury, for example, than about moral hazard 
that increased the risk of property damage. The increased moral hazard that resulted 
from risk-redistibutional premiums in connection with the former might therefore 
be less acceptable than in connection with the latter. 
In short, like adverse selection, the threat of moral hazard may operate as a 
constraint on the capacity of insurance regulation to promote risk redistribution. 
But the strength of the constraint depends on the significance of the concern about 
moral hazard in particular contexts.62 
3. The Interaction of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 
The adverse selection and moral hazard produced separately by risk-
redistributional premiums may also operate synergistically. Potential policyholders 
who anticipate that they will incur losses that they could, but will not, avoid are 
more likely to seek coverage when premiums are risk redistributional than when 
they are not. Conversely, those potential policyholders who anticipate exercising 
more control over whether they incur losses than other potential policyholders are 
less likely to seek coverage when premiums are risk redistributional. The purchase 
of insurance based on moral hazard will thus produce adverse selection.63 
Interestingly, however, the adverse selection that might otherwise be produced 
in this way by potential moral hazard may sometimes be completely or partially 
offset by another phenomenon. Some policyholders are more risk averse than 
others. As I indicated earlier, when a group of potential policyholders’ being at low 
risk of suffering loss is correlated with their being comparatively risk averse, then 
there will be less adverse selection than would otherwise be expected, or even the 
reverse—proverse, or propitious selection. The intuition explaining this effect is 
that some people who are especially careful are also risk averse. Indeed, that may be 
part of the reason they are more careful than others. To the extent that this is the 
case, comparatively low-risk potential policyholders will tend disproportionately to 
purchase coverage. When this occurs, the space available for risk redistribution is 
greater than it would otherwise be, because those who would otherwise tend not to 
 
62. Id. 
63. See generally Liran Einav et al., Selection on Moral Hazard in Health Insurance, AM. ECON. REV., 
Feb. 2013, at 178. 
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purchase coverage because the redistribution raised their premiums will tend to do 
so anyway, and the adverse selection that would otherwise occur will be neutralized. 
Similarly, it is possible that some parties who pose an above-average risk of 
loss also are comparatively less risk averse than others and therefore seek coverage 
at a below-average rate. The intuition explaining this effect is that some people who 
are comparatively careless are also less risk averse. To the extent that this is the case, 
comparatively high-risk potential policyholders will tend to adversely select less than 
might otherwise be expected. This effect would also create more room for risk 
redistribution. 
In sum, risk redistribution may be undermined when moral hazard leads to 
adverse selection. But adverse selection may itself be partially or even wholly offset 
when risk averse parties also pose below-average risk, and when those who pose an 
above-average risk of loss seek coverage at a lower rate than might otherwise be 
expected. When either or both effects occur, potential moral hazard may not lead 
to significant adverse selection, and this possible negative effect of risk 
redistribution will be reduced or eliminated. 
 
